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In the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
S'1'.\1,E OF UTAH,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

vs.
\\'ILLIAM KEITH BURRIS,
Defendant and Appellant.

~

~

Case No. 9939.

APPELLANT'S BRIEF
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND THE ISSUES
INVOLVED
This matter comes before the court upon an information charging the defendant with Bastardy, charging in
effect that as the result of acts of sexual intercourse on or
about the :.!nd day of :F"ebruary, 1962, and on or about the
11th day of February, 1962, in Cedar City, Iron County,
Utah. \vith one Bonnie Ann Bauer, an unmarried female,
. said Bonnie Ann Bauer became pregnant and that the
defendant \Vas the father of said child.
A plea of not guilty was e·ntered by the defendant,
and after many delay~. defendant \vas tried in December
of 1962 before an Iron Couty jury \Vhich unanimously found
him guilty. Thereafter an order '"as filed by the court on
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or about the 14th day of February, 1963. Judg1nent was
imposed by the District Court of Iron County, Utah. From
this order of judgment and from this verdict of the jury,
defendant appeals.
ARGUMENT

POINT I
rrHE COURT ERRED IN DENYING DEFENDANT'S
MOTION FOR. CHANGE IN VENUE.

On the 12th day of April, 1962, the defendant caused to
be prepared a motion for change of venue, which was filed
on the 13th day of April, 1962, and \V hich was argued on a
regular law and motion day thereafter. rrhe court denied
the motion for change of venue. The circumstances of this
motion for change of venue \Vere very similar to the old
case of State of Utah vs. Brasch and Sullivan that \vas
before the Supreme Court of the State of Utah and the
United States Supreme Court several times, in which a motion for change of venue was denied by the trial court by
and for the reason that it was not properly supported. In
the Brasch and Sullivan case, the only information that
could be made available, because of the refusal of people
to sign statements and affidavits, was the affidavit of
counsel as to the effort that he had made, and the reply he
had received. Thereafter, after spending two days and
going through approximately 120 jurors and failing to get
a jury because of the prejudice that was shown in the prospective jurors, said motion was reinitiated and was allowed.
In the case at bar, a motion f,or change of venue was supported only by the affidavit of the defendant, which showed
without any question that the matter had received complete publicity throughout the county, and that it was impossible to call a jury trial on this item. The trial court
denied the motion for change of venue, and erred in so
doing. The minutes of the court reveal that the jury was
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out less than 20 n1inutes and could not possibly have considered the evidence during that time as well as organize.
Fnder these conditions, there is no question that the jury's
mind was made up prior to trial, and that the trial court
erred in failing to grant the motion for change of venue.

POINT II
DEFENDANT'S RIGHTS WERE DENIED BY TRIAL
COURT'S FAILING TO GRANT IMMEDIATE TRIAL.
It is noted that the alleged acts of sexual intercourse
were on the ~nd of February, 1962, and the 11th of February, 1962. The complaint \Vas filed in March, 1962, and a
warrant of arrest was issued on the 16th day of March,
1962, and \Vas delivered to the sheriff on the 20th day of
l\larch, 1962, and arrest was made on that day. On the day
of arrest, had an act of sexual intercourse occurred on
the 2nd day of February, 1962, and the complaina·nt was
pregnant therefrom, said pregnancy on the date of arrest
was approximately six or seven \veeks. A preliminary
hearing was held on this matter at the request of the defendant on the 26th day of !\larch, 1962, and same was
bound over to the District Court. The defendant appeared
in the District Court in April of 1962 on this matter, and
thereafter, on the 4th day of May, 1962, caused to be made
a demand for imn1ediate trial which was filed and served
on the 7th day of May, 1962. The trial court denied same
on the basis that there could not be a trial until there was
a child.
Both the Constitution of the United States and the
Constitution of the State of Utah, speaking of rights of an
accused person, guarantee a speedy public trial. This is
accomplished in Amendment VI to the Constitution of the
l.Jnited States, one of the amendments that constitute the
Bill of Rights: "In all crilninal prosecutions, the accused
~hall ha \·e the right to a speedy and public trial." And in
the Constitution of the State of Utah, Article I, Section 112,
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the same language is used, "to have a speedy public trial..,
In both instances, the terminology is used in criminal prosecutions. This again raises the question as to whether or
not a bastardy prosecution is a crilninal prosecution. \Vhile
there are cases of that nature which hold that for certai'n
purposes it is not a criminal prosecution, at the same time
it is tried by the State, in the name of the State, by an information filed by the District Attorney, and in n1ost instances, the procedure that is followed is the criminal procedure rather than civil procedure. Under these circumstances, when the trial court denied the demand for immediate trial for the defendant William Keith Burris, it
failed to protect his constitutional rights.
POINT Ill
THE TRIAL JUDGE INSTRUCTED THE JURY TO
DISREGARD SOME OF THE EVIDENCE.
In the above entitled matter, during the trial many of
the proceedings were put into evidence, the purpose being
to show that the prosecutrix had made many conflicting
statements as to when the alleged actual sexual intercourse
took place. Both the complaint, the amended complaint
and the information were placed in evidence for this purpose. Thereafter, in Instruction No. 8, the trial court gave
the strict instruction to the effect that pleadings were to
serve as a means of placing a matter before the court, and
that these items were not evidence. However, when the
documents themselves had been entered in evidence, and
copies of the documents \Vere entered as exhibits, then
and under these conditions, the court's instruction No. 8
became improper, and amounted to an instruction to the
jury to disregard a portion of the defendant's evidence. Any
instruction that instructs a jury to disregard evidence that
has been admitted as evidence is improper. This item alone
should be the basis for reversal.
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POINT IV
'rl-IE JURY

~_,AILED

TO CONSIDER THE EVIDENCE.

Therl' is no question that the jury had entered the
trial \vith its mind already 1nade up due to the local publicity on this matter, and it is noted that the jurors were
discussing this matter long before the State's case was
completed, and had made up its mind prior to the completion of the case of the State. This information is set
forth in the transcript on Page 113, Line 16; remarks made
by one of the jurors named Stapley had been overheard
in the hall during recess. This matter was brought to the
court's attention, and upon being questioned by the court,
Juror Stapley answered, "I did make the remark in the
hall as
\\·as coming in that \Ve did get a little tired
:'itting here yesterday listeni'ng to cross examination and
that was all that was said."
Bearing in mind that the transcript of the preliminary
hearing \vas entered in evidence, and the jury was out less
than 20 minutes, there is no question that the jury had
made up its mind long before submission to the jury, and
had 1nade up its mind prior to the trial and resented any
time spent on the matter.

,,.e

POINT V
THE EVIDENCE DID
TION.

~OT

JUSTIFY A CONVIC-

As the trial court's rule, it is the State's duty to present a preponderance of evidence in connection with this
matter. The State did not at any time present a preponderance of evidence, and the evidence as presented by the
State did not any any time justify a conviction of the defendant in connection \vith this matter.
There is no question that Miss Bauer, the prosecutrix,
made several conflicting statements as to when the alleged
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acts of sexual intercourse took place, which should entirely
discredit her testimony. In the first place, according to her
testimony, both in the preliminary hearing and the trial,
and the transcript of the preliminary hearing was subinitted to the jury, Miss Bauer went to Dr. Williams two or
three weeks after the alleged act of intercourse. At that
time she told him that the act of intercourse was on the
4th of February. This may be found in the transcript of
the preliminary hearing at Page 15, Line 24, "she mentioned that she'd had intercourse, I believe, it was the 4th of
February. That's the only date she mentioned to me."
The complaint which was entered in evidence was
sworn to by Miss Bauer and states that there was an act
of sexual intercourse o~ or between the 2nd day of February and the 11th day of February, 1962. At a later time
she told two individuals there \Vas only one act if sexual
intercourse. This is found in the transcript of the prelimin~
ary hearing on Page 61, Line 1, "Q-And you told them
specifically that there was only one act of sexual intercourse, didn't you? A-1 told the1n that at the time."
Also, when Miss Bauer first told her parents concerning the alleged acts of sexual intercourse, she told them
the act took place on differents days from those she has
stated in the complaint. On 26 March, 1962, when her
mother was testifying in relation to the preliminary hearing, Page 68. Line 29, Q-And did she tell you there had
been more than one time?" This discussion continue on
Page 69, Line 1, "A-No, not right then. She just told us
when it happened. Q-And when did she say? A-She said
it was Friday at his home. Q-What date \vould that be?
A-1 don't remember the dates. Q-And when she first
told you about it, it would have been somewhere near the
last of February or early in March? A-It was-it would
be the last of February, yes. Q-lt was definitely after the
11th, was it? A-Yes."
It was rather disconcerting that this discussion took
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place on the 26th of March in the preliminary hearing on
the above entitled matter, in which a young lady tells her
tnother she is pregnant from an act of intercourse on a Friday, and has made this statement within a month of the
time of the alleged acts of sexual intercourse, and an examination of the 1962 calendar for February reveals the
9th of February was a Friday, and Mrs. Bauer called Mr.
Burris about Friday, Feb. 9, 1962. Under these circumstances, where a young lady tells her mother one date, the
doctor another, signs a complaint to the fact that it was behveen the 2nd of February and the 11th of February, and
then signs an amended complaint to the effect that it was
on the 2nd of February and the 11th of February, It cannot help but lead one to the question as to whether or not
the act every took place at all. c·ertainly these dates were
much better remembered in February and March immediately after the act, if there was one, than in December after a child had been born. Certainly the doctor's bei'ng told
the 4th of February raises the question as to when the act
took place. History is replete \vith instances in which a
young lady becoming pregnant looks around to see who
the best catch is. In this insta·nce, having told her mother
that it was the 9th of February, finding out the defendant
could account for himself on the 9th; then switching to the
4th of February, and finding out the defendant could account for himself on the 4th; then switching to a double
occasion on the 2nd and 11th of February, after having told
t\\·o other individuals, same being her bishop and a stake
president, that it \vas a single act, the question is raised
as to whether or not she knows when said alleged act of
intercourse took place, and if so, when?
Also, the testimony of Bruce Decker, which is in no
\Vay contested, raises a serious question as to whether or
not Miss Bauer was in Cedar City on the night of the 2nd
of February, 1962. In the transcript of the trial on Page 91,
Line 29, in response to a question, "Did you see the basketSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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ball game between Cedar and St. George that \vas played
in St. George," Miss Bauer answered, "Yes, I went to one
game there." The testimony of Bruce Decker who was the
coach of the team, to the effect that his team played in
St. George on 2 February, 1962, is found in the transcript
of the trial on Page 172, commencing on Line 13, to and
including Line 3 on Page 174. One cannot help wondering
as to the authenticity and reliability of Miss Bauer's testimony pertaining to the alleged act of sexual Intercourse
in Cedar City the evening of the 2nd of February, 1962,
and her testimony that she saw the ball game at St.
George, which according to the records of Mr. Decker, was
played in St. George on the 2nd of February.
Also, the probability of conception under the circun1stances related by Miss Bauer lends very little creditability to her testimony. Although in the preliminary hearing
Miss Bauer testified that did climax as part of the act of
sexual Intercourse, Dr. Graff said that this could not happen. The testimony of Miss Bauer to this effect is found in
the transcript of the preliminary hearing on Page 39, Line
23, where in response to the question, "What do you mean
by 'we did finish?', she answered, "Well, we went to the
climax." From this point on in the transcript of the preliminary hearing, to li'ne 8 on Page 40, a good deal of detail was gone into by the cross-examiner to make certain
that this testimony was not a mistake. It became quite apparent that the young lady meant what she said. Dr. A.
LaMar Graff, Jr., at the time of the trial testified, in his
opinion, to the effect that there is ·no possibility of a female
having a climax as part of her first sexual act. This is
found commencing at Page 221, Line 27, being a question
and ans\ver and the next question and answer, commencing "Now, Doctor, from a medical standpoint, what is the
probability that a female will climax on her first sexual
act?, and ending, "If an opinion means anything, I'd say
it was nil." Also, the medical testimony i'n connection with
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this matter is such that there appears to be very little probability that there was any conception or could have been
conception at the tin1e testified by Miss Bauer. Under the
circumstances of this matter, it is necessary to entirely
discount the testimony of Dr. Williams because of admitted prejudice against the defendant. This prejudice is
found in the transcript of the trial at Page 151, Line 6, "Q
-Doctor, have you ever objected to your daughter going
out with Mr. Burris? A-Yes." It is further apparent that
there was a definite prejudice on the part of Dr. Williams
in his various attempts to say that the child was born
premature. A very definite answer on the question can be
found in the transcript on Page 141, Line 10, 'Q-Now,
Doctor, in that first paragraph about 14 lines down, there
is a sentence, 'There is general agreement that 2500 grams
(3 pounds eight ounces) should make the upper boundary
of prematurity, that is, the borderline between a premature and a mature infant." Would you tell us what that
means please?" A-"Well, it doesn't mean anythi'ng specific." From that point on, there is a great deal of vague
testimony from Dr. Williams to the effect that the child
\vas premature. However, there is no question that this is
an afterthought. Although Dr. Williams attended at the
deliYery, the records of the delivery room were brought
into the courtroom and identified by the custodian. Then
Berniece Bulloch, who \Vas a nurse in the delivery room
and who made the records, and show definitely that at
the time of the birth the entry was made on the records,
"Apparently normal male child." This is found in the
transcript of the trial, Page 209, Line 12, and stopping on
Page 210, Line 12. Although Dr. Williams supervised the
delivery, no evidence of abnormality was recorded at the
time of delivery, and no record was made of same in any
hospital record, and at the same time a question comes
up, \vhy was Dr. \Villian1s, even though present, attempting to show an apparently normal male child was in effect
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premature? The answer is, of course, the child was born
on 14 October, 1962, and could just as easily have been
conceived a month earlier than Miss Bauer testified. The
testimony of Dr. Graff on this point, Page 221 of the
transcript, was to the effect that in a norn1al situation
with the last menstrual period having commenced on 22
January, the child \vould have been born between the 22nd
of October and the 5th of November; also that if the normal period last named commenced on the 23rd of December
1961, the child would have been born tween the 22nd of'
September and the 5th of October of 1962; also to the
effect that if a boy, they generally \Vent over. Under these
circumstances, \Vhere the child was born the 14th of October, which would be between the midway of the two
normal periods for the child to have been born, based upou
the various times the last n1enstrual period commenced,
and with the probability that if a boy it would be over, and
where a male child was born~ and will all hospital indications, normal, it seems that there is a strong probability
that the conception \vas prior to the time indica ted by
Miss Bauer. This is even more important when it is taken
into consideration that on 2 February, 1962, 1\tliss Bauer
was to a baskeball game in St. George between Cedar City
and St. George, \vhich according to Coach Bruce Decker,
was played the 2nd of February, 1962. Also, that Dr. Graff,
on Page 224, Line 14, of the trial transcript, was asked
questions to the effect that if an act of intercourse took
place on the 2nd of February and conception followed
therefrom, what would be the normal birth date of a boy,
and he answered to the effect that it might be as late as
November, this pertaining to the actual alleged act of
intercourse, which \\ as claimed to have taken place the
night Miss Bauer \vas in St. George, when she testified she
was in Mr. Burris' apartment in Cedar City. In the event
of an alleged act of intercourse on the 11th of February,
which would be nine days later, this date shifts all the
1
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datl'~

nine days later, on which Dr. Graff testified on Page
:.!:.!-!, commencing Line :23, to the effect that it could be
as late as the 9th of November, and that if a boy it might
~u over a few days.
Under these circumstances, with a
n1ale child born on 14 October, and it was apparently normal according to hospital records, one is led to question
the time of conception of Miss Bauer. While the testimony
uf Dr. Graff, and to a certain extent, Dr. Williams, even
though prejudiced, does not rule out completely the possibility of conception during the period indicated by Miss
Bauer, it certainly shows that this was improbable. This is
especially true when one takes into consideration that this
testitnony \vas given sho\ving \vhat was meant by a chart
on Page 105 of Williams on Obstetrics as revised by Eastman and Hellman 12 Edition, and \\t·here this is accepted
as complete authority on obstetrics, and is today being
used as the text on obstetrics and gynecology at the Uni,.et·sity of Utah lVIedical School. In court, part of the testimony \\·as given to explain a chart on Page 103 of said
text, and photostats of the charts in both instances have
been entered in evidence, and the testimony, together with
the charts, shows that there is very little probability of
conception from either alleged act of intercourse, both of
which acts are denied by the defendant. 'fhis defendant
has ne\·er admitted intercourse with Miss Bauer under
any conditions \Yhatsoever, and maintained throughout the
trial that there \Vas no intercourse.
10 C.J.S. on Bastardy, Section 96, Page 181, pertaining
to the period of gestation, advances the premise that the
('Vidence must be sufficient to show intercourse by the
defendant \Vith the prosecutrix within the period of gestation. Under the circumstances of this matter, there is no
probability that the alleged acts of intercourse as testified by the prosecutrix vvere \Vithin the period of gestation
and produced the child. This rule is endorsed by the State
of Utah by the Supreme Court thereof, in the case of
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State vs. Steadman, 259 P. 326, 70 Utah 224; also in State
vs. Hunt, 368 62d 263, 13 Utah 2d 32. In addition, the showing of within the period of gestation is endorsed by the
Utah Supreme Court on the following items, State vs.
Reese, 135 P. 270, 43 Utah 447; State vs. Hammond, 148 P.
420, 46 Utah 249, and Anderson vs. State, 238 P. 557, 65
Utah 512. In the case of the State vs. Reeves, \vhich was
reversed and remanded on this basis, there is a specific
statement to this effect:
"Before the accused can be found guilty, however,
the State must prove by a preponderance of the
evidence that he had sexual intercourse with the
prosecutrix within the period of gestation, and unless this is done, both his conduct and that of the
prosecutrix outside of that period are, ordinarily,
wholly immaterial and irrelevant."
This should be applied to the case at bar where there is
testimony from the prosecutrix that the alleged acts took
place outside the normal period of gestation, where it is
more than probable fron1 a medical standpoint that conception had taken place a month earlier than the prosecutrix testified, where the defendant admits no intercourse
whatsoever, and where an individual witness testified that
at the time the alleged act of intercourse took place, the
prosecutrix was in another situation, and where the prosecutrix told her parents that the alleged act of intercourse
took place on the 9th of February, told the doctor that it
took place on the 4th of February, swore to one complaint
that it was between the 2nd of February and the 11th of
February, swore to an amended complaint that it was
on the 2nd of February and the 11th of February. Bearing
all this in n1ind, one \vould raise the question as to \vhether or not the young lady knows whether or not she at any
time had sexual intercourse, and where in all probability
the sexual intercourse took place a month earlier than the
testimony of the prosecutrix.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

13
One should also bear in mind that this was an item
that had been discussed in a stnall rural community for a
IH'riod of time in excess of the normal birth time of the
rhild; thnt the defendant had been denied immediate trial
and change of venue, and that the jury at no time paid
any attention to the testimony being offered by the defen~e and resented heing called upon to listen to the crosst':'\amination of the first \Vitness. The conviction of this defendant appears to be an e·ndorsement of the age-old saying, ''The minute a girl points a finger at a man, he doesn't
ha,·c a chance."
CONCLUSION

That there is no evidence upon which to base a con\'irtion. That the evidence rather than being a preponderance of evidence of the guilt of the defendant, is actually
a preponderance of evidence of his innocence. That the defendant's rights were abridged by the court. That the jury
had a pre-conceived opinion and paid no attention to the
e\·idence. That the Judge instructed the jury to disregard
part of the evidence. That the defendant was denied his
constitutional right of an immediate trial, and \vas erroneously denied a change of venue. Because of these errors
the acquittal of the defendant should be ordered.
Respectfully submitted,
PATRICK H. FENTON,
Attorney for Appellant
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